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HOUSE BILL 1219:
A STUDY
INTRODUCTION
0 N JUNE 17, 1970, then Governor James A. Rhodes signed into law
Amended Substitute House Bill 1219 (hereinafter referred to as
H.B. 1219), commonly called the Ohio Campus Disorder Act.' To most
of the general public and to critics of the existent university policies
toward campus disorders, the bill represented a long overdue "get tough"
policy against "radical" and "undisciplined" students, and a reaction
against university administrators who were viewed as being far too lenient
with their students, almost to the point of condoning disruptive student
behavior. To other faculty members, administrators, students, and civil
libertarians, however, the bill represented a denial of certain fundamental
constitutional rights to students, and an example of repression far greater,
perhaps, than that which they viewed as causing campus disorders in
the first place.
H.B. 1219 has been in effect for more than a year now, and although
it has been the subject of one court challenge,2 the issues concerning its
constitutionality have not been resolved. Because of the importance of
these issues the statute will certainly be challenged in the future.
The significance of H.B. 1219 is twofold. First, it represents the most
complex and thorough-going response to the problem of campus disorder
in the country. Few states have attempted to simultaneously impose
criminal sanctions on disrupters, provide for discipline through an
elaborate hearing procedure outside the university structure, and also
create extraordinary powers for university administrators in time of
emergency.3 As of yet, the writer knows of no other state which has
attempted to so specifically provide what procedural rights students are
entitled to in disciplinary hearings.4 The broad scope of these provisions
suggests a variety of novel and serious constitutional problems.
Secondly, and perhaps more significantly in the long run, H.B. 1219
represents an assertion by the state of the primary responsibility for the
discipline of disruptive students in the more serious cases. Since student
1OHio REv. CODE §§2923.61, 3345.22, 3345.23, 3345.24, 3345.25, and 3345.26.
(Effective date September 16, 1970).
2 Blount v. Davis, Case No. C71-197 (N.D. Ohio, filed February 25, 1971).
3 Florida and Louisiana have come the closest in providing as comprehensive statutory
schemes. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§240.045, 239.581, and 877.13; and LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§17:3103, 17:3104, 17:3105, 17:3108, and 17:3109.
4 See notes 8, 9, and 11 infra.
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discipline has traditionally been regarded as a matter reserved exclusively
to the university community, the state's assertion of primary authority for
discipline could profoundly alter the university-student relationship and
must necessarily limit the flexibility of the university's response to
campus problems.
Because H.B. 1219 does raise certain constitutional questions which
will soon come before the courts, and because of its potential impact on
higher education in Ohio, a complete study of it is in order. This
Comment seeks to do that by analysis of the background events leading
up to the bill's introduction, its legislative history, a summary and
explanation of the act's important provisions, an analysis of potential
constitutional infirmities in view of current court decisions, and a
discussion of relevant policy considerations. The purpose of this Comment
is not to assess the wisdom or desirability of the statute, but to examine it
in terms of current concepts of due process.
BACKGROUND
The basic impetus for H.B. 1219, as well as for the enactment of
statutes throughout the country specifically relating to the campus, was
the growing number of campus disturbances in the late 1960's and 1970.
The American Bar Association Commission on Campus Government
and Student Dissent noted in 1970:
Within the past academic year alone an estimated one hundred and
forty-five institutions of higher learning were torn by violence,
and nearly four hundred more endured some form of non-violent
disruptive protest.5
Coupled with an expectation that universities would be increasingly
subjected to considerable disruption was the growing feeling that the
problem was beyond the control of university administrators. The
President's Commission on Campus Unrest reflected the growing view in
terms unusually blunt for commission reports:
Universities have not adequately prepared themselves to respond to
disruption. They have been without suitable plans, rules, or sanctions.
Some administrators and faculty members have responded irreso-
lutely. Frequently, announced sanctions have not been applied. Even
more frequently, the lack of appropriate organization within the
university has rendered its response ineffective. The university's own
house must be placed in order.6
5 REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssOciATioN COMMISSION ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT
AND STUDENT DISSENT, American Bar Association, at 1 (1970).
6 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST at 7, (Arno Press
ed., 1970).
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With campus problems ever increasing and the universities apparently
unable to control the situation, state legislatures began to "move into any
vacuum created by vacillation or ineffectiveness in college and university
disciplinary procedures." '7 It was not until 1969, however, that most of
the state legislatures began to enact comprehensive acts specifically
dealing with campus disruption. This legislation fell into three general
categories in terms of overall purpose and effect. The first category
purported to deprive any student involved in a campus disturbance at a
state supported university of all forms of financial aid.8 The second
category included statutes creating criminal offenses generally denomi-
nated as "interference," "obstruction," or "disruption."' 9 Most of the
states which enacted campus disruption legislation had statutes falling
into this category. Any activity disrupting, obstructing, or interfering with
the lawful and peaceful activities of the university was made a mis-
demeanor, as was the destruction or unlawful occupation of campus
property and buildings. A third group of statutes affected the university
disciplinary process itself, either by making provisions for expulsion of
students who committed certain offenses, 10 or by authorizing university
officials to promulgate codes of conduct and discipline students for
violation thereof." There appears to be no significant case law interpreting
these statutes to date.
Congress has also responded to the campus situation by enacting
7 Edward C. Kalaidjian, Problems of Dual Jurisdiction of Campus and Community,
STUDENT PROTEST AND THE LAW 135 (G. Holmes ed., 1969).
8 See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. §30-17; PURDEN PA. STAT. ANN. §§5104.1, 5158.2; TENN.
CODE ANN. §49-4120; and Wise. STAT. ANN. §36.43.
9 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§41-1447, 41-1448; CALIF. REV. CODE ANN. PENAL
CODE, §§602.10, 626.6, 626.8; COLO. REV. STAT. §40-8-22; GEN. LAWS IOWA§33-3716; BURNS IND. STAT. ANN. §§10-4532, 10-3534; LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§14-328; ANN. CODE MARYLAND ART. 27, §123A; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§752.581, 752.582, 752.583; MINN. STAT. ANN. §624.72; REV. STAT. NEB. §28-831;
N.M. REV. STAT. ANN. §§40A-20-10, 40A-20-11, 40A-20-12; OKLA. STAT. ANN.§21-1327; S.C. CODE §16-551; TENN. CODE ANN. §§39-1215; 39-1216, 39-1217;
TExAs EDUC. CODE ART. 295a, 295b; UTAH CODE ANN. §§76-66-3, 76-66-4, 76-66-5;
and REv. CODE WASH. ANN. §§28B.10.570, 28B.10.571, 28B.10.573.
'0 See supra note 3.
1 See, e.g., CALIF. REV. CODE ANN. §§22505, 22508; FLOR. STAT. ANN. §240.045;
KANSAS STAT. ANN. §17-1401; McKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS N.Y. ANN., EDUC. LAW,
§6450. For a discussion of the California statute see Comment, Recent California
Campus Disorder Legislation: A Comment, 8 HARv. J. LEGIS. 310 (1971). A
discussion of the New York statute is found in Crary, Control of Campus Disorders:
A New York Solution, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 85 (1969).
Winter, 1972)
3
Scott: House Bill 1219
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1972
AKRON LAW RFvIEw
legislation depriving disruptive students of certain forms of federal
financial aid.-2
The forerunner ,f H.B. 1219 in Ohio was section 3345.21, Ohio
Revised Code, which is still in effect.12 It empowers boards of trustees of
state universities to regulate the use of all state university property and
prescribe codes of conduct for students. Such codes are required to be
published in a manner "Reasonably designed to come to the attention
of and be available to all faculty, staff, visitors, and students." The statute
also provides that a board of trustees can eject, expel, or suspend any
person violating the regulations, but does not provide any procedure for
doing so, apparently intending to leave that to each university. 4
Public and legislative discontent with the effectiveness of internal
university disciplinary proceedings increased in 1969 and this undoubt-
edly encouraged the series of bills introduced into the Ohio House of
Representatives during the First Session of the 108th General Assembly.
These bills'5 were referred to the House Education Committee and in
turn to a subcommittee. After seven public hearings and a considerable
amount of testimony from university administrators, the subcommittee
reported -that it would take no action on the bills. This decision was
based not only on testimony from law enforcement officers that no new
laws were needed, but also on:
... [t]he desire and assurance of university and college administrators
that they can and will deal effectively and firmly with future
12 20 U.S.C.A. §1060 provides:
(a) If an institution of higher education determines, after affording notice and
opportunity for hearing ... that such individual has been convicted by any
court of record of any crime ... which involved the use of... force,
disruption, or seizure of property ... to prevent officials or students in such
institutions from engaging in their duties or pursuing their studies, and that
such crime was of a serious nature... the institution... shall deny for a
period of two years any further payment to, or the direct benefit of, such
individual under any of the programs specified in subsection (c) of this
section.
(b) If an institution of higher education determines, after affording notice and
opportunity for hearing... that such individual has willfully refused to obey
a lawful regulation... and such refusal was of a serious nature and
contributed to a substantial disruption of the administration of such
institution, then such institution shall deny... for two years ... any further
payment.., under any of the programs specified in subsection (c) of this
section.
Subsection (c) programs include: the federal student loan program, educational
opportunity grant program, the student loan insurance program, the college work-
study program, and fellowship programs.
For a discussion of these provisions, and their merit, see Comment, Higher
Education and the Student Unrest Provisions, 31 OHio ST. L. 3. 111 (1970).
13 132 Ohio Senate Journal 468 (Effective 6-10-68).
14 Of course, procedures in public schools would have to comply with constitutional
standards of due process.
15 House Bills 57, 403, 481, 776, 777, and 77 ,
[Vol. 5:1
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occurrences and that they will implement the laws of this state in
dealing with such disturbances.'6
While the report left the primary responsibility for meeting disorders
with the universities, the subcommittee warned that should administrators
fail to deal "immediately, firmly, and effectively" with disorders, it was
recommending that the "Legislature act in their place .... ,,17
The campus disorders leading up to the killing of four students by
the National Guard on May 4, 1970, at Kent State University and the
riots and campus closings at Ohio University and Ohio State University,
provided the final catalyst for a new flood of legislative proposals, of
which H.B. 1219 was a part. Those individuals involved with H.B. 1219
recall that the public pressure for strong legislation was overwhelming,
and it was said that letters ran nine to one in favor of firm, if not harsh
action against campus dissidents.' 8 As a result, some fourteen bills 9 were
introduced between May 8 and May 27, 1970, offering a wide variety of
solutions to campus problems. Bills provided for such disciplinary action
as immediate expulsion for any student who engaged in any act of force
or violence disrupting university activities (university officials to make
the determinations); criminal penalties for interference with law enforce-
ment officers and college administrators; criminal sanctions for rioting or
the closing of any school; civil class actions by students or administrators
against student disrupters; summary suspension of disruptive students
followed by a hearing, the student being banned from the campus
during any suspension; and power was given to university administrators
to declare emergencies and impose curfews and limit freedom of
assembly. There was even a bill 20 providing for the execution of an
"oath of understanding," a type of contract between the student and
university, the student agreeing either to abide by university rules, or
resign if unable to do so.
While it was uncertain what action would be taken, it was clear
that the Legislature would act.
16 Report of the Sub-committee on the Education Committee, 108th General Assem-
bly, Ohio House of Representatives, at 3 (mimeo., 1969).
17 Id. at 4.
18 Interview with Mr. Thomas Swisher, Ohio Legislative Service Commission, at the
State House, Columbus, Ohio, September 15, 1971 [Hereinafter referred to as
Interview).
19 House Bills 1194, 1195, 1196, 1202, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1214, 1215, 1218,
1219, 1220, and 1229. See Ohio Assembly Bulletin, 108th General Assembly, Final
Ed. (1969070).
20 H.B. 1229,
Winter, 1972]
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF H.B. 1219
The first draft of H.B. 1219 was introduced on May 22, 1970,21 and
four days later it was referred to committee. While the bills introduced
in the first session of the 108th General Assembly were assigned to
the House Education Committee, the group of bills introduced in May
were referred to the Judiciary Committee. Presumably, it was felt that
that committee was better equipped to handle the complex legal problems
presented by the new bills.
Although less than a month passed between its introduction and its
final approval, nearly two weeks of all-day hearings were held on the
proposal, and no one apparently was prevented from testifying. In fact,
the response of educators invited to speak was described as weak.n
While the final form of H.B. 1219 has been met by strong objections
from many sides, it is a modest proposal when compared to the first draft
introduced into the Ohio House. As originally written, H.B. 1219 created
a crime of "disruption," which occurred when a person "in circumstances
creating a substantial risk of disrupting the orderly conduct of lawful
activities at a college or university," wilfully committed certain enumer-
ated acts. Some of these acts included engaging in such vaguely defined
conduct as "violent or turbulent behavior," making "unreasonable noise"
or "addressing unwarranted and grossly abusive language to any
person."n In terms of disciplinary procedures, the first draft provided
that (1) any person convicted of an offense wilfully committed in
circumstances creating a substantial risk of disruption of the orderly
conduct at a university could be immediately dismissed by college
authorities; (2) arrest for an offense outlined above could result in
immediate suspension, and (3) any other wilful conduct tending to
"urge," "incite," "encourage," "maintain," or "aggravate" a riot, whether
constituting an offense or not, resulted in immediate suspension if found
necessary to protect university interests.24 The bill thus provided for what
was called "front end" suspension or dismissal; that is, immediate
disciplinary action before any hearing was held on the validity of the
charges. However, a hearing before a faculty committee was provided
subsequent to the dismissal or suspension, but only upon written request
by the student.25 The faculty committee was empowered to modify or
21 All information concerning the dates of legislative action on H.B. 1219 were taken
from the Bulletin of the 108th General Assembly, Final Ed. (1969-70), at 470, unless
otherwise specifically noted.
22 Interview, supra note 18; Interview with State Representative William Batchelder
on May 13, 1971.
23 First draft, H.B. 1219 [Hereinafter cited as First draft], §2923.61 (A) (1)-(6).
24 First draft, §3345.22 and 3345.23.
2 First draft, §3345.24(C).
[Vol. 5:1
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affirm the sanctions imposed in any way, and its decisions were final. 26 In
addition to other provisions, the bill declared the existence of an
emergency situation calling for it to be put into immediate effect.Y
While in the Judiciary Committee the bill was redrafted a dozen
times, 28 but what precise changes took place before a substitute bill was
reported on June 2 are difficult to determine since most of these
intermediate drafts were discarded. The general approach of the bill was
probably intact when it reached the House floor on that day. After a few
minor amendments, 29 by a vote of 73-20 the bill was declared an
emergency measure entitled to immediate effect and then was passed,
80-14, and sent to the Senate.
In the Senate the bill was substantially changed, the most
significant change being the rejection of the "front end" suspension
provisions. Again, it is unclear from available information precisely what
changes were made. However, the primary hearing provisions which later
became part of the final bill, now Ohio Revised Code subsections 3345.22
(A)-(H), were added by amendment from the floor 30 on June 4th, the
same day the bill passed the Senate, 21-10. The Senate, however, refused
by a nearly equal margin to declare the act an emergency measure.
The next day the House refused to accept the Senate amendments
and the bill went to conference committee when the Senate insisted on its
amendments. On the same day that committee made its recommendations,
in large part accepting the Senate version with a few language changes.3 '
The greatest change in conference involved the addition of subparagraph
(B) to what later became section 3345.24 Ohio Revised Code. This
provided that the disciplinary procedures contained in the bill in no way
limited the inherent authority of university officals to summarily suspend
a student, faculty, or staff member provided there was notice given and a
hearing was subsequently provided. Both Houses accepted the conference
report and the bill was sent to the Governor for his signature.
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS
H.B. 1219 adds one section to the criminal code3 2 and five sections
to the education code.3 3 Like the original bill introduced, the first section
of the act (section 2923.61 Ohio Revised Code) creates the crime of
26 First draft, §3345.25 (C).
27 First draft, §3345.99(B) (3).
28 Interview, supra note 18.
29 See 133 Ohio House Journal 2237-2242 (June 2, 1970).
30 133 Senate Journal 1580-1582 (June 4, 1970).
31 133 Ohio House Journal 2326-2327 (June 5, 1970).
32 OHIO REv. CODE §2923.61.
33 Omo REv. CODE §§3345.22, 3345.23, 3345.24, 3345.25, and 3345.26.
Winter, 1972]
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"disruption." Any person is prohibited "in circumstances which create
a substantial risk of disrupting the orderly conduct of lawful activities at a
college or university"3 4 from wilfully performing the following acts:
(1) entering or remaining upon university property "without privilege" or
refusing to leave such place when ordered to do so by proper authority;
(2) violating any restriction imposed pursuant to section 3345.26 Ohio
Revised Code; (3) engaging in any conduct urging, inciting or encour-
aging another to violate section 2923.61 in circumstances in which such
conduct would create a clear and present danger of such violation;3 5
(4) with force or violence disrupt the orderly conduct of lawful activities
at a college or university, or (5) engage in conduct threatening or
involving serious injury to persons or property.36 While not specifically
stated in the bill, violation is apparently a misdemeanor, since the penalty
for violation is a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or imprison-
ment of thirty days, or both, for the first offense. Subsequent offenses
are punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or
imprisonment of six months, or both.3 7
Sections 3345.22 and 3345.23 embody the principal disciplinary
scheme of the act. Any student38 arrested for violating certain enumerated
sections of the Ohio Revised Code 39 affecting persons or property on a
college or university is subject to the procedure. 40 The specified sections
generally include most offenses associated with campus disruption, includ-
ing all forms of assault, arson, malicious destruction of property, carrying
concealed weapons, riot, and inciting to riot, as well as the disruption
offenses under section 2923.61 Ohio Revised Code.
Upon the arrest of the student, the arresting authority is required to
notify the president of the university which the student attends, who in
turn is required to notify the Ohio Board of Regents. Within five days
of arrest (subject to continuances for reasonable cause not to exceed ten
days) the Board of Regents must afford the student a hearing to determine
whether such student shall be suspended from the university. Presiding
over the hearing is a referee selected by the Board of Regents, who must
be an attorney admitted to practice in Ohio, but not connected in any
way with the university involved.4' The referee has the authority to
34 0mo REv. CODE §2923.61 (A).
35 Omo REv. CODE §2923.61 (A) (1)-(3).
36 OHio REv. CODE §2923.61 (B) (1) and (2).
37 OHIo REV. CODE §2923.61 (C).
38 The act also covers faculty, staff members, and employees. "Student" has been
used here only for the purposes of brevity.
39 Set forth in Omo REv. CODE §3345.23(D).
4 0 Omo REv. CODE §3345.22(A).
41 Oio REv. CODE §3345.22(B).
[Vol. 5:1
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administer oaths, issue and enforce subpoenas, and preserve order in the
proceedings by use of the contempt power.4 2
The core of the bill for the purposes of procedural due process
analysis later is subparagraph (D) of section 3345.22, which defines the
nature of the hearing as well as the procedural rights afforded the accused.
The hearing shall be "adversary in nature" and conducted "fairly and
impartially," but, more importantly, "the formalities of the criminal
process are not required." The person whose suspension is being
considered has: (1) the right to be represented by counsel (although
counsel need not be furnished); (2) the right to cross-examine witnesses,
and (3) the right to testify and present testimony in his behalf. In
addition, in the absence of waiver, any testimony of the person whose
suspension is being considered cannot be subsequently used in any
university proceeding against him. Interestingly, no specific provision is
made in the section requiring notification to the student involved of the
specific criminal violation which gives rise to the hearing. Such notice
would be valuable in attacking the "jurisdictional" basis for any hearing,
particularly if the student's offense was outside those set forth in section
3345.23(D). Section 3345.22(B) does provide that immediate notice of
time and place of any hearing must be sent to the individual, but does
not go beyond that. At least in one actual case, however, such notice
was, in fact, given.43
Subparagraph (D) also empowers the referee to separate the
witnesses and bar from the proceedings any persons who are not
essential to it, with the exception of the news media.
If the referee finds on the preponderance of the evidence that the
student has committed the offense for which he was arrested, he may
order the person suspended or placed on strict disciplinary probation if
his continued presence is deemed not dangerous to the university.
Subsequent violation of the probation results in "automatic" suspension,
although the bill is unclear on the question of who determines when such
a violation has occurred. Any suspensions imposed are effective until a
determination of guilt or innocence is made on the criminal charge by
a court."4 If there is a conviction, the suspension automatically becomes
a dismissal,4 5 but the student may be readmitted in the discretion of the
board of trustees after the lapse of one calendar year from his dismissal
on terms of strict disciplinary probation. If there is no conviction (or a
42 OHo REv. CODE §3345.22(C).
43 Exhibit "E" attached to the complaint in Blount v. Davis, supra note 2, was a
copy of a notice of hearing sent to the defendants involved in that case. It specifically
cited the code sections violated which gave rise to the hearings.
44 OIIO REv. CODE §3345.22(E).
45 Omo REv. CODE §3345.23 (A).
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conviction is reversed on appeal), the suspension (or dismissal) terminates,
the student is reinstated, and all record of such suspension (or dismissal)
expunged from his records. 46 Any person not appearing for a hearing
is to be declared suspended.47
Orders of the referee are appealable on questions of law and fact to
a court of common pleas which may permit the student suspended
to return on terms of strict disciplinary probation if his presence will
not prejudice its good order.48
Trials for offenses triggering the disciplinary procedures are to take
precedence over all other matters in the courts, 49 which enables the
university to quickly rid itself of disrupters, as well as to make
unwarranted suspensions as short as possible.
Section 3345.24 provides that the disciplinary procedures in the bill
are applicable regardless of any regulation or procedure used by the
university itself, and in no way affects the right of the university to take
appropriate disciplinary action or to summarily suspend any student.
No person suspended pursuant to sections 3345.22 or 3345.23 may
enter or remain on university premises without the permission of the
board of trustees or the president of that university.5
The final provision of H.B. 1219 is section 3345.26, a section which
has received relatively little notice considering its potential impact on
student disorders and on the constitutional rights of those involved. That
section empowers the board of trustees or the president of a university to
declare a "state of emergency" when there is a "clear and present danger
of disruption of the orderly conduct of lawful activities" at a university.
During such an emergency the president of the board of trustees has the
power to: (1) limit access to university property; (2) impose a curfew;
(3) restrict the right of assembly, and (4) provide "reasonable" measures
to enforce (1)-(3). Notice must be given of all restrictions, and as in
section 3345.24, this section does not affect the inherent authority of
university officials to meet disorders, whether an emergency exists or not.
H.B. 1219 IN THE COURTS
On February 25, 1971, Blount v. Davis was filed in the federal
district court for the Northern District of Ohio seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against H.B. 1219.51 Two student plaintiffs sought to stop
46OHio REv. CODE §3345.23 (E).
47 OHIO REV. CODE §3345.22(H).
48 OHIo REv. CODE §3345.22(G).
49 OHIO REV. CODE §3345.23 (D).
50 OmO REV. CODE §3345.25.
51 Case No. C71-197 (filed February 25, 1971).
[Vol. 5:1
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hearings which they were about to undergo as a result of their arrests
arising out of some demonstrations at Kent State University in early
February. Other students and faculty members, subject to application of
H.B. 1219 in the future, sought a declaratory judgment that HB. 1219
was unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs argued that H.B. 1219 on its face and as applied,
violated the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, they alleged that it violated the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment by subjecting students to two
trials. They argued that the student was forced under H.B. 1219 to
undergo a disciplinary hearing on the same charge and concerning the
same facts as were involved in the criminal prosecution stemming from
the arrest.5 2 It was contended that H.B. 1219 violated the Fifth Amend-
ment and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
it "arbitrarily and unreasonably establishes a legislative classification of...
university students.., as the subject for greater punishment for an offense
... than for.., other persons."53 It was further urged that the bill violated
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because a person
was "required, under penalty of automatic suspension" to give evidence
and testimony involving the same facts and issues in the subsequent
criminal proceeding, the protection in H.B. 1219 extending only to the
defendant in such a proceeding which was "not co-extensive with the pro-
tection of the privilege accorded them under the Fifth Amendment."'
Further objection was made to the fact that the referee's findings
were based on the "preponderance of the evidence," and it was argued
that the findings should be based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard. Further, the short period between the preparation for the
hearing, the hearing, and the criminal trial was said to be a denial of fair
trial, as was the automatic suspension for failure to appear at the hearing
because it was without regard to extraordinary circumstances which might
prevent the defendant's attendance. 55
H.B. 1219 was said to violate the Sixth Amendment by denying a
public trial because the referee was empowered to exclude all those not
essential to the proceedings. 56 It was contended that such language as "the
good order and discipline of a college or university will not be prejudiced
or compromised thereby, '57 "in circumstances which create a substantial
52 Blount complaint, para. 32.
53 Blount complaint, para. 33.
54Blount complaint, para. 34.
5 Blount complaint, para. 35.
56 Blount complaint, para. 36.
57 OHIo REV. CoDE §§3345.22(E), 3345.22(G).
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risk of disrupting the orderly conduct of lawful activities at a college or
university"58 and "engage in conduct which threatens or involves serious
injury to persons or property at a college or university,"5 9 was vague and
overbroad and thus violated the plaintiffs' rights to notice of the nature of
the charges against them under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 0
Also alleged was a violation of the right to trial by jury under the Sixth
Amendment. 61 Finally, the penalties under H.B. 1219 were said to be cruel
and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 62
The court failed to reach the merits of this barrage of attacks
(putting the hearing off indefinitely on the constitutional issues), and
declined to enjoin the disciplinary hearings on the authority of a
then-current Supreme Court decision concerning the propriety of federal
courts enjoining state prosecutions. That decision, Younger v. Harris,63 in
essence limited Dombroski v. Pfister" to its facts by directing federal
courts not to enjoin state criminal proceedings for alleged violations of
constitutional rights unless the state prosecutions were in bad faith.65 The
plaintiffs in Blount, however, did contend that the enactment and
application of H.B. 1219 was in bad faith. Its passage, it was said, was
intended to "harass" plaintiffs and others, and to "intimidate" and
"inhibit" them in the exercise of their First Amendment rights, as well as
to "exonerate" the National Guard from blame in the shootings at Kent
State and "whitewash" reports of the President's Commission and F.B.I.
on the Kent tragedy.66 While the Court's opinion is but one sentence long
and makes no specific findings, presumably there was a finding that there
was not bad faith for the purposes of Younger. If the sole basis of
petitioner's argument was that the passage of the bill was to punish
students because of Kent State, the Court's apparent judgment that no
bad faith was shown was probably correct. It has been shown that
legislation similar to H.B. 1219 had been under consideration for several
months prior to Kent State and that many other state legislatures had
already responded to campus disorders by some sort of legislation. This is
at least some evidence that this legislation was not a rash, thoughtless
response. While these responses may not have been wise, it is difficult to
say they were acting in bad faith. Indeed, it may be impossible to even
8OHio RaV. CODE §2923.61 (H).
5 9 Omo REv. CODE §2923.61 (B) (2).
60 Blount complaint, para. 37.
6 1 Blount complaint, para. 40.
62 Blount complaint, para. 39.
6391 S. CL 746 (1971).
64 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
6591 S. CL at 753.
66Blount complaint, para. 58.
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show that a legislature acts in bad faith, for such requires an analysis of
the hidden motivations of every legislator. While it would perhaps have
been preferable for the legislature to allow universities more time to
respond to the problem, the seriousness and immediacy of the problem
certainly suggested that something had to be done. The elimination of
the harsh language in the first draft of section 2923.61, as well as the
changing of the "front end" suspension provisions (which probably would
have been legally valid 67), do not seem consistent with a bad faith attempt
to truly "harass" or "intimidate" students. Of course it was alleged that
what was left in the bill by the legislators was sufficiently bad to
characterize the bill as in bad faith. However, it would seem that the fact
that the bill is unwise or even violative of constitutional rights does not
establish "bad faith" in its passage. In addition, it is not so clear that
H.B. 1219 is unconstitutional on its face. In fact, H.B. 1219 provides more
procedural safeguards to the defendant than courts presently require
of university disciplinary proceedings. 68 The record of any unjustified
suspension is to be expunged from the student's record, an admittedly
small, but important concession.
It should be noted that Younger also suggests that enforcement of
a statute which is on its face "patently and flagrantly" unconstitutional
could be properly enjoined by a federal court.69 Perhaps the Court's order
here represented a finding on that fact as well.
Up to the time of publication of this article no further proceedings
have occurred in Blount with respect to the merits of the constitutional
claims.70
67 Summary suspension in certain circumstances (with a hearing at a later date) has
met the approval of a surprisingly wide variety of groups. See JOINT STATEMENT ON
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, Sec. VI(G), American Association of University
Professors and others, 53 A.A.U.P. Bul. 365 (1967); REPORT OF THE A.B.A.
COMMISSION ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND STUDENT DISSENT, American Bar
Association, at 24 (1970); MODEL CODE OP STUDENT RIGHTS, REsPoNsiBILITES AND
CONDUCT, American Bar Association, S 44 (1969); AcADEMIc FREEDOM AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OF STUDENTS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, American Civil Liberties
Union (1970); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027,
1074 (1969). See also Stricklin v. Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin, 297 F.
Supp. 416, 420 (W. D. Wisc. 1969). One commentator has contended that the delayed
suspension provisions finally adopted in H.B. 1219 seriously fail to protect the
interests of the university because of the time lag between the disruptive conduct and
the disciplinary hearing (although only a matter of a few days). Pettigrew, Due
Process Comes to the Tax-supported Campus, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 111, 122 (1971).
68 See the section on procedural due process infra.
69 91 S. Ct. 746 at 755.
70 On April 15, 1971, defendants filed an answer substantially denying all plaintiffs
constitutional objections. Subsequent to the writing of this article the writer learned
that hearings on the constitutional claims may be held sometime in January, 1972.
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THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A student's procedural rights in university disciplinary proceedings
were quite limited until 1961 when the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided the case of Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Higher Education.71
Prior to the Dixon case the courts had been reluctant to interfere in what
they saw as internal university matters and conceded to the universities
considerable, if not absolute, power to discipline students. This approach
was justified on a number of theories. The university was said to
stand in loco parentis to the student, and accordingly the university
had broad authority to discipline its "child" without interference.72 The
student-university relationship was also sometimes characterized as being
contractual in nature, the student agreeing by his entrance to abide by
certain conditions or face automatic suspension or expulsion. 73 Certainly
the most powerful relationship theory was the concept that college
attendance was a "privilege" and as such it could be taken away
arbitrarily, with no thought at all of due process. This latter theory
received the Supreme Court's blessing in Hamilton v. Regents of the
University of California,74 one of the few cases to ever reach the Court
dealing with student discipline.
The privilege argument, in particular, persisted, and found support
as late as 1959 in the case of Steier v. New York State Education
Commissioner,75 which one writer has called the "last gasp of a dying
order." 76 So far as can be found, at the time of the Steier decision no
court had ordered reinstatement for a student expelled or suspended
from college. 77
The foregoing merely re-emphasizes the dramatic shift made by
Dixon in 1961. After discarding both the "privilege" and "contract"
theories, the court in Dixon suggested the change in society which gave
rise to the need for a new approach:
It requires no argument to demonstrate that education is vital and,
indeed, basic to civilized society. Without sufficient education the
plaintiffs would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy
71294 F. 2d 150 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
72 A good discussion of this approach is found in Van Alstyne, Procedural Due
Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 368, 370 (1963).
73 See Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144, 11 Ohio C. Dec.
515 (1901); Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1925); Gott v. Berea
College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College
278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923).
74 293 U.S. 245 (1937).
75 271 F. 2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1959).
76 Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 V.ND. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (1969).
77 Wright, supra note 76, at 1029.
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life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties
and responsibilities of good citizens.78
While not specifically holding that a college education was a matter of
constitutional right, the Court found that it was a matter of such great
value to the individual that it could not be taken away arbitrarily, and
that such deprivation required an act "consonant with due process of
law."' 79 The Court specified what it felt was necessary to satisfy the
requirements of due process: (1) there should be some notice of
the hearing containing a statement of the specific charges and grounds
which would justify expulsion; (2) the student should be given "the
names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written report on
the facts to which each witness testifies"; (3) the student should have the
opportunity to present a defense and to produce either oral or written
testimony of witnesses in his behalf, and (4) a report of results and
findings of the hearing should be open to the student's inspection.80
Besides setting forth certain guidelines for the hearing itself, Dixon
was also important because it represented a more active judicial role
in reviewing university disciplinary proceedings which had long been
left virtually untouched.
Like many cases that mark great changes in the direction of the law,
however, Dixon failed to go far enough to ensure that this direction of
development would be continued. It failed to specify what should be done
with regard to certain other rights of the adversary process, such as the
right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to
confrontation of witnesses. In fact the Court, after enumerating some of
the requirements of due process, emphatically indicated that, "[t]his
is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to
cross-examine witnesses, is required." 8' Many courts after Dixon would
use this language and the Court's failure to include all the rights of
the adversarial process within its holding to support their contention
that procedural rights beyond those set out in Dixon were not required
by due process.
The cases shortly after Dixon substantially followed its holding
without modification.8 2 But subsequent cases began stressing the limiting
language in Dixon (that no full-dress judicial hearing was required),83 or
78 Dixon, 294 F. 2d at 157.
79 Dixon, 294 F. 2d at 155.
80 Dixon, 294 F. 2d at 158, 159.
81 Dixon, 294 F. 2d at 159.
82 See Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Due v.
Florida A&M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Flor. 1963).
83 See Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 236 (S.D. W. Virg. 1968), aff'd, 399 F.
2d 638; Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
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began to develop standards of due process of their own 84 without
outrightly rejecting Dixon.85
In the midst of all this rather confused development the case of
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College was decided.8 6 First, it
comprehensively examined the problems set forth in Dixon and attempted
to further delimit the potential scope of that decision. Secondly, the case
was apparently highly influential on those who drafted H.B.1219Y1 Why
this particular case was singled out as the primary statement of the
requirements of due process is unclear, since it is entitled to no more
force as the guiding law than is Dixon. Undoubtedly, the more restrictive
approach which Esteban took toward students' procedural due process
rights was more in conformity with the legislative aims. Of course this
picking-and-choosing between diverse standards has been facilitated by
the Supreme Court's failure to consider the issue.88
Esteban was an action by several college students under the Civil
Rights Act, 42 United States Code section 1983, seeking reinstatement
after being suspended for activities associated with some demonstrations at
Central Missouri State College in March, 1967. The students had originally
been suspended without notice or hearing, but a court order, based on
Dixon, directed that they be given a hearing,s9 at which the original
suspensions were reaffirmed. The plaintiffs then filed the complaint here,
alleging inter alia that the hearings which they had been given lacked
procedural due process. After disposing of preliminary questions of
jurisdiction, mootness, res judicata and exhaustion of remedies, the court
outlined its view of the nature of student disciplinary hearings:
The discipline of students in the education community is, in all but
the case of irrevocable expulsion, a part of the teaching process.
... the process is not punitive or deterrent in the criminal law sense,
but the process is rather the determination that the student is
84 See Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 258 F. Supp.
515 (D. Colo. 1966) ("fundamental fairness" test); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp.
280 (D. Colo. 1968) ("fundamental fairness in light of all circumstances"); Moore
v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala.
1968) ("rudimentary elements of fair play"); Perlman v. Shasta Joint Junior College
District Board of Trustees, 9 Cal. App. 3d 873, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563 (Court of Appeals,
Calf. 1970) ("fair notice and fair hearing depending upon the circumstances").
85 Wright notes that no court, state or federal, has challenged the basic Dixon holding
that students have constitutional rights that the courts will recognize and protect.
22 VAN. L. REv. 1027, 1032 (1969).
86290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 415 F. 2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969); cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
s7 Interview with State Representative William Batchelder (R-23rd District) on May
13, 1971.
88The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Dixon, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), and
Esteban, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
89 See Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
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unqualified to continue as a member of the educational community.
Even then, the disciplinary process is not equivalent to the criminal
law processes of federal or state criminal law.90
The court flatly stated that such cases as Kent v. United States, 91 In re
Gault,92 and Cox v. Louisiana 93 were inapplicable because analogies
between disciplinary proceedings and the criminal law were not sound. The
court refused to require the safeguards of the criminal process because:
... [t]o impose upon the academic community in student discipline
the intricate, time-consuming, sophisticated procedures, rules and
safeguards of criminal law would frustrate the teaching process
and render the institutional control impotent.9 4
After discussing the university's authority to prevent unlawful gatherings
and the problem of vagueness with regard to university codes of conduct,
the court attempted to define the nature of the student-university
relationship. The attendance by the student at the university was a
"voluntary entrance into the academic community" by which the
student "voluntarily assumes obligations of performance and behavior
reasonably imposed by the institution of choice relevant to its lawful
missions, processes, and functions."9 5 The court appears to be returning
somewhat to the contractual or privilege theory of the pre-Dixon period,
although this is not entirely clear. The court avoids the implications of
Dixon without rejecting it entirely. It seems, however, that by using this
approach the court was manifesting its reluctance to review and critically
examine student disciplinary procedures, and that no extension of student
rights beyond Dixon would be forthcoming. This view is further supported
by the court's statement that they should not intervene to enjoin university
procedures unless there was: (1) a deprivation of due process, that is
"fundamental concepts of fair play"; (2) "invidious discrimination";
(3) "denial of federal rights," or (4) "clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or
caprious action."96 The court held that since the plaintiffs had not
90 290 F. Supp. at 628.
91383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Court rejected the parens patual philosophy used in
juvenile proceedings and held that due process required that a juvenile be provided
with a hearing, assistance of counsel, access to juvenile records, and a decision from
the court suitable for appellate review.
92 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In striking down Arizona juvenile court procedure, the court
held that due process required: (1) adequate notice of hearing; (2) right to counsel
to all; (3) a privilege against self-incrimination, and (4) the right to confrontation
and sworn testimony of witnesses available for cross-examination.
93 377 U.S. 536 (1965). The court held a Louisiana breach of peace statute unconsti-
tutional for overbreadth because it could be (and was) applied to limit provocative,
but protected speech.
94 290 F. Supp. at 629.
95 290 F. Supp. at 631.
96 Id.
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established any of these factors, relief must be denied. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion in
Esteban,97 Judge Blackman (now Justice Blackman) writing the majority
opinion. The opinion does not add much, other than to say that the
Court was not certain that it was significant whether attendance at a
college was a right or privilege, since a student could "act so as
constitutionally to lose his right or privilege to attend a college."
98
"College attendance, whether it be a right or privilege, very definitely
entails responsibility."' 99
Shortly after its opinion in Esteban the Western District Court of
Missouri, en banc, felt there was such confusion as to what standards
were to be followed in disciplinary proceedings that it issued a general
order to help clarify the area.100 It substantially reiterated the approach
of the court in Esteban, but specifically noted that there were three
requirements of due process: (1) notice in writing of specific grounds
and the nature of the evidence on which the disciplinary proceeding is
based; (2) a fair opportunity for the defendant to present his position,
explanations, and evidence, and (3) no discipline except on grounds
supported by substantial evidence.' These are basically the requirements
set forth in Dixon. The court went on to say, however, that:
There is no general requirement that procedural due process in
student disciplinary cases provide for legal representation, a public
hearing, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, warnings
about privileges, self-incrimination, application of principles of
former or double jeopardy, compulsory production of witnesses,
or any of the remaining features of federal criminal jurisprudence. 102
With minor exceptions, the Missouri federal court's statement of the
required procedural rights seems to include those minimal rights upon
which most courts have agreed. 103 The American Bar Association's
Commission on Campus Government and Student Dissent has listed the
procedural rights which it feels should be given to students: (1) timely
notice of charges; (2) right to cross-examine opposing witness; (3) an
97 415 F. 2d 1077 (1969).
98Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969).
99 Id.
100 General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D.
133 (1968).
lo Id. at 147.
102 Id.
103 Wright concludes there is a general agreement among the courts on four safe-
guards: (1) notice of the grounds of the charge; (2) notice of the nature of the
evidence against the defendant; (3) opportunity to be heard in defense, and (4) no
punishment except on the basis of substantial evidence. 22 VANW. L. Rxv. 1027,
1071-72 (1969).
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opportunity to be heard; (4) that findings be based on substantial
evidence, and (5) the right to be represented by counsel. 0 4 With the
exception of the right to cross-examination and to representation by
counsel, these are consistent with Dixon, Esteban, and the General Order.
Although there are a few decisions in which a right to counsel has been
recognized, most decisions are to the contrary,' °  and there appears no
strong support for a right to cross-examination.'06
An examination of the procedural rights provided under H.B. 1219
reveals that it meets and exceeds what the courts have deemed necessary
for university disciplinary proceedings. It should be recalled that the bill
not only provides for notice, opportunity to testify and present testimony,
and findings based on preponderance of evidence (probably a higher
standard than "substantial evidence"), it also provides for representation
by counsel, the right of cross-examination, and some self-incrimination
protection. Thus on preliminary analysis, no procedural due process
problems are encountered. However, this analysis would not seem to fully
answer the question. Both in Dixon and Esteban the courts had specifically
noted that the complexities of the criminal process would not be required
because of the nature of the body which would have to hold these
hearings. After holding that a "full-dress" judicial hearing was not
constitutionally required of the university, the court in Dixon added:
"[s]uch a hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college
activities, might be detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere
and impractical to carry out."'10 7
In language cited from Esteban above, 08 the court there makes it clear
that to require elaborate procedures would work great handicaps on the
104 REPORT OF THE A.B.A. COMMISSION ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND STUDENT
DISSENT, American Bar Association, at 24 (1970). This is also substantially the
position presented in the Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest
(Arno Press ed., 1970); JOINT STATEMENT ON RIGHTS AND REspoNsxiLrrs, Ameri-
can Association of University Professors and others, 53 A.A.U.P. Bul. 365 (1967);
and the MODEL CODE OF STUDENT RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND CONDUCT, American
Bar Association (1969).
105 Wright, supra note 69, at 1075; pro counsel, see Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d
94, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 899 (1967); Madera v. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D. N.Y.
1967), rev'd, 386 F. 2d 778 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). Contra,
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F. 2d 807 (2nd Cir. 1967); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.
Supp. 228 (S.D. W. Virg. 1968), aff'd, 399 F. 2d 638 (1968); Due v. Florida A&M
Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Flor. 1963); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College,
290 F. Supp. 622 (1968); General Order on Judicial Standards, 45 F.R.D. 133 (1968).
106 State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W. 2d 822 (1942); General
Order on Judicial Standards, 45 F.R.D. 133 (1968).
107 294 F. 2d at 159.
108 290 F. Supp. at 629.
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institution and work injustice to the defendant as well. 1 9
The university community does not lend itself to judicial proceedings.
Students and faculty do not make particularly good judges or
jurors. Few are equipped to fill these roles adequately. Faculty and
administrators on judicial bodies may find themselves in the dual role
of prosecutor and judge. Increasingly, lawyers are present during
proceedings and it is difficult for judges without legal training to
control the hearings.-' 0
It seems apparent, then, that the requirements of procedural due process
were largely developed with a view toward what would be practical for
the academic community. Undoubtedly, the court's traditional reluctance
to get involved in university affairs also affected the extent to which it
would require "complex" procedures which the courts might have
to enforce in the end. Under H.B. 1219, however, the entire disciplinary
process is removed from the educational environment. The judge and jury
are a legally trained referee, and presumably the prosecutor is the
university proceeding through counsel. Thus the university discipline cases
cannot be taken as fully controlling the question of H.B. 1219's sufficiency
under procedural due process. The same considerations which lead the
courts to find the intricacies of the adversarial process a substantial
burden on the university structure would seem absent in the situation
where the proceeding is taken entirely out of university hands. If
anything, it would appear that courts could and should require more
of the disciplinary process outside the university milieu. As former
Justice Fortas once cautioned, "[d]epartures from established principles
of due process have frequently resulted not in slighted procedure, but
in arbitrariness.""'
Concerning the right to counsel, in particular, H.B. 1219 does allow
for such representation, but counsel need not be furnished. At least one
case 112 suggests inferentially that if the government proceeds through
counsel then the student should be entitled to it as a matter of right.
Particularly since the penalty of expulsion "can often have much more
serious consequences to a student than a typical penalty he would receive
in a civil court,"' m the need for "fairness, impartiality, and orderliness"
109 ".. [T]o compel such a community to recognize and enforce precisely the same
standards and penalties that prevail in the broader social community would serve
neither the special needs and interests of the educational institutions, nor the ultimate
advantages that society derives therefrom." Goldberg v. Reeents of the Univ. of
California, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (Court of Appeals, Calif. 1967).
110 Knauss, The University Response to Disruptive Behavior, STuDENT PRoTEsT AND
Ta LAW 21 (G. Holmes, ed. 1969).
'-' In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
MWasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F. 2d 807, 812 (2nd Cir. 1967).
1.s Knauss, supra note 110, at 22.
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as expressed in some recent cases in the juvenile area,114 would require
counsel in all cases, and appointment if necessary. In other areas, H.B.
1219 goes beyond current requirements by providing for confrontation
and cross-examination as well as for some self-incrimination protection,
thus enabling it to withstand, for the most part, even a stricter standard
of due process, should it be imposed.
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
H.B. 1219 has been said to suffer from a number of other constitu-
tional infirmities. It is argued that it violates the double jeopardy clause,
the right to public trial, and the right to trial by jury. The referee's
findings based on preponderance of the evidence is alleged to be a denial
of due process. It has been contended that punishment under it is a
violation of equal protection and a cruel and unusual punishment.' 5
Most or all of these objections are based on the assumption (and
contention) that the disciplinary proceedings under H.B. 1219 are
criminal in nature; of course, such rights as the right to be free from
double jeopardy, trial by jury, and the "beyond reasonable doubt"
standard ordinarily apply to criminal proceedings. Case law, however,
uniformly stresses that disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature.-'6
Esteban indicated that such proceedings are not "punitive or deterrent
in the criminal sense" and not "equivalent to the criminal law processes
of federal or state criminal law."' 117
It seems that unless the proceedings can be characterized as criminal,
many of these objections must fall. 118 While in form the proceeding is civil
in nature, the effect of it on the student may be more serious than some
criminal offenses.- 9 There is some caselaw in Ohio suggesting that even
114 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 382 U.S. 541 (1966).
115 See complaint in Blount supra.
116 Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W. Virg. 1968); Siegel v. Regents of
the Univ. of California, 308 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Calf. 1970); Perlman v. Shasta Joint
Junior College Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 9 Cal. App. 3d 873, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563 (Court of
Appeals, Calif. 1970); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn.
1968).
117 290 F. Supp. at 628.
118 Supporters of H.B. 1219 view the proceedings not as additional punishment for
misconduct, but as a device primarily for the protection of the university. Thus it is
the object of the proceedings rather than their form which is determinative of the
civil-criminal question.
This emphasis on the state's interest, however, tends to overlook the effect on
the student and the need to protect his rights. Section 3345.22(E) directs the referee
to suspend a student guilty of the offense involved, but he may permit the student to
remain on campus when the "good order and discipline" of the university will not
be prejudiced or compromised thereby.
119 Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA.
L. REv. 290, 296 (1968).
Winter, 1972]
21
Scott: House Bill 1219
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1972
AKRON LAW REvmw
in administrative proceedings there should be an attempt to comply with
all aspects of the adversarial process as far as possible. 20
There seems to be no objection to trying and punishing a person
civilly and criminally for the same act, in fact this is often done.121
However, there may be policy objections to trying the student twice for
the same act. Professor Van Alstyne suggests that such a procedure may
violate the spirit, if not the technical form, of double jeopardy. 122 He
argues that separate disciplinary sanctions should only be applied where
the university has a distinct interest to protect aside from the broader
interest of society in general.123 Since H.B. 1219 automatically goes into
effect without regard to whose interests need protection, it seems to
disregard Van Alstyne's approach, although it is arguable that the
university always has an interest, perhaps the paramount one, in
disciplining a student for on-campus offenses.
Concerning the public hearing problem, the few cases which discuss
the issue soundly hold that an open hearing is not an absolute require-
ment, 124 particularly because of the problem of disciplinary hearings
themselves becoming disrupted and turned into "political trials." H.B.
1219 does provide that although individuals not essential to the hearing
"may" be excluded therefrom, this does not apply to members of the
news media. While this appears unconstitutional on its face and would
be so as applied, a court could interpret this section to allow exclusion of
the public only where the hearings have been disrupted, thus avoiding the
constitutional issue.
The most potentially troublesome portion of H.B. 1219 may be
section 3345.26. This is the section giving the board of trustees or
president of a university the power to declare a state of emergency and
limit access to campus, impose curfews, and restrict the right of assembly.
There seems to be little question that a curfew-type ordinance, properly
drawn and administered, is not unconstitutional.
... [T]o be consistent with due process, government restrictions on
the freedom of movement must bear a direct and material relation
to the achievement of a compelling governmental object. A city faced
with the immediate prospects of a civil disorder with all that has
120 See Bucyrus v. Department of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 2d 370 (1929);
State ex. rel. Southard v. Columbus, 128 Ohio St. 295, 191 N.E. 2d 5 (1934). Ohio's
Administrative Procedure Act, O8Io REv. CODE §§119.01-119.13, apparently does not
apply to this proceeding, §119.01.
121Arrests for serious traffic offenses may involve both criminal penalties and
administrative proceedings for revocation of license.
122 Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582, 599 (1968).
1M Id. at 601.
124 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala.
1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
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meant in terms of deaths, injuries, and destruction, would have little
difficulty in establishing such a compelling interest.
125
Whether the statute is constitutionally firm depends in large part on
whether it is narrowly drawn and provides clear guidelines for administra-
tive discretion- 2 Under H.B. 1219 the president of a university may
declare an emergency where there is "a clear and present danger of
disruption of the orderly conduct of lawful activities at such college or
university through riot, mob action, or other substantial disorder."' 27 One
of the few recent cases on the subject reaching the Supreme Court level,
and one apparently influential on the sponsors of H.B. 1219, dealt with
the question of the permissible scope of emergency statutes. Stotland
v. Pennsylvania2 8 involved the validity of a Philadelphia ordinance
authorizing the mayor to declare a state of emergency "if he finds
that the city or any part thereof is suffering or is in imminent danger
of suffering civil disturbance, disorder, riot or other occurrence which
will seriously endanger the health, safety and property of the citizens."'"
The court majority dismissed the appeal on the grounds of lack of
a substantial federal question, suggesting that the statute was free from
constitutional defect. If anything, the language in section 3345.26 is
more precise and restrictive than that in the ordinance in Stotland. Justice
Douglas dissented in Stotland, arguing that there were substantial
questions here since the prohibitions authorized under the ordinance could
extend to all places, public and private, to assemblies regardless of their
orderliness, and there were no limitations on the length of time of any
prohibition.130 It appears likely that there will be further development in
this area of the law in the near future.
CONCLUSION
This examination of H.B. 1219 has shown, I believe, that the act
stands on a much firmer constitutional foundation than appears, perhaps,
on first reading. Clearly, to what extent the courts will apply the
safeguards of the criminal process remains open to question because of
the uniqueness of the act's structure. The courts should, I think, apply
stricter standards of due process to H.B. 1219 that they have formulated
for university proceedings since those under H.B. 1219 more closely
125 Comment, The Riot Curfew, 57 CALF. L. REv. 450, 473 (1969), citing Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
'26 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1962).
12 Omo REv. CODE §3345.26(A).
'28398 U.S. 916 (1970), dismissing an appeal of 214 Pa. Super. 35, 251 A. 2d 701
(1969).
'2 398 U.S. at 916.
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resemble the criminal process. With the university proceeding through
counsel and a legally trained state officer as judge and jury in an
adversary setting, the increased power of the state confronting the
individual almost compels increased protection for him, at least the assur-
ance that he will have counsel despite his economic circumstances. Of
course, the presence of counsel should help in preserving the other rights
of the student, and quite often the assurance that rights are protected is of
more importance than the statement of the existence of the right itself.
Beyond that, however, it is contended that most of the objections to
H.B. 1219 are really representative of an underlying disapproval of it on
policy, not legal grounds. Many of the critics really feel this is not the
proper response to the problem of campus disorders. It does seem
unfortunate and perhaps unwise that the primary responsibility for
discipline should be so completely removed initially from the academic
community, that community supposedly most affected by the conduct in
question.131 Also, the creation of yet a third level of sanctions (criminal
sanctions and the still-intact university sanctions being the other two)
seems questionable, and seems to be a disciplinary "overkill." Of course,
it must be remembered this all evolved from the view that the universities
had failed to discipline their own.
Unless a court is found which is particularly sensitive to policy
arguments, or it is successfully urged that proceedings under H.B. 1219
are more nearly criminal than civil in nature, it does not seem that future
challenges to H.B. 1219 are likely to be successful.
PAUL M. SCOTT*
[Editor's Note: On January 11, 1972, the federal district court in Cleveland dismissed
the complaint without prejudice in Blount v. Davis upon a motion of plaintiff for
leave to withdraw the complaint because of changed circumstances.]
131In its Interim Report, the 108th Ohio General Assembly Select Committee to
Investigate Campus Disturbances conceded that "it is undesirable for any legislature
to attempt the actual management of the universities." Report at 3 (mimeo. 1970).
The report suggests that a better solution than that in H.B. 1219 is a standardized
model code of conduct and disciplinary procedures which all state universities could
follow, the universities retaining the primary responsibility for student discipline.
* The author would like to express his appreciation for the invaluable assistance given
him by State Representative William Batchelder (R-23rd District), and by Thomas
R. Swisher of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission.
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